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(RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) suggests that the world trade system is 
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trade system. But is this even likely? The difficulties of free trade agreement (FTA) 
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return to the most widely used modality of trade liberalization—unilateral actions—but this 
time involving the multilateralization of preferences rather than unreciprocated reductions in 
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1. Introduction 
 
When Jagdish Bhagwati (1991) famously described the maze of overlapping free trade 
agreements (FTAs) as being akin to a “spaghetti bowl,” it spawned a host of gastronomical 
metaphors, some more bizarre than others. When the epicenter of FTA proliferation switched 
to Asia in the 2000s, Richard Baldwin (2004) dubbed it the “noodle bowl.” When attention 
shifted to how to rectify the mess and return order to the world trade system, lasagna and even 
pizza appeared on to the menu (Hamada as quoted in Bhagwati [2008]). Turning spaghetti or 
noodles into lasagna involves consolidating bilateral FTAs into a regional bloc, while making 
pizza involves subsequently linking these regional blocs through cross-regional tie-ups, 
eventually achieving fully multilateral trade. Turning lasagna into pizza is a culinary feat that 
finds its parallel at the political level in turning the regional blocs into a multilateral one. But 
both the lasagna–and pizza–making processes are probably better represented by the activity 
involved in solving different kinds of jigsaw puzzles, as this is what they more closely resemble. 
 
While the recent success in Bali in securing a multilateral agreement on trade facilitation may 
have resuscitated the World Trade Organization (WTO), it also marked the death knell for the 
single undertaking. Given that the Doha Round can no longer be concluded as originally 
intended, both processes—trying to solve the regional and global jigsaw puzzles—are likely to 
continue. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)+6 group—consisting of the 
10 members of ASEAN plus Australia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, India, and New Zealand—is attempting to create a consolidated bloc called 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) by 2015, in order to supersede the 
various ASEAN+1 FTAs and other internal bilateral FTAs between individual countries 
(Menon 2013a). At the same time, the ASEAN countries are aiming to conclude the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) by the same deadline. Around the world, the United States (US) 
and the European Union (EU) are pursuing a Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(T-TIP), while the US is also leading the promotion of a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
southward to include seven RCEP members, among others. There is also MERCOSUR, 
involving Latin and South American countries, the African Economic Community, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, and several others. 
 
Can these attempts at regional consolidation succeed and, if they do, will it be possible to link 
them up to get to global multilateral trade? In other words, will the pieces of the global jigsaw 
puzzle fall neatly into place, or will the trade landscape disintegrate into fragmented blocs? But 
before that, the pieces of the puzzle need to be built first, through regional consolidation or 
cross-regional tie-ups, and this too is like assembling constituent mini-jigsaw puzzles; that is, 
both regional and global jigsaw puzzles will need to be solved, in that order, if this route is to 
eventually lead to global free trade. What is the likelihood that such an approach can work? 
Section 2 of this paper discusses the regional jigsaw puzzles, while Section 3 looks at the 
challenges associated with solving the global one. A way forward in resolving the trade mess, 
involving a revival of the unilateral approach as applied to preferences, is proposed in Section 
4, while the final section concludes. 
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2. The Regional Jigsaw Puzzle 
 
Although Asia is a latecomer to preferential trade agreements,1 it has been catching up since 
the 2000s (Figure 1). The past decade has seen more FTAs proposed, negotiated, and ratified 
in Asia than anywhere else. Within Asia, most of the activity has centered on East Asian 
countries and ASEAN+6 (Figure 2). There is also a complex web of bilateral FTAs among 
members of the ASEAN+6 group of countries (Table 1). Therefore, when considering regional 
puzzles, it is only appropriate that we use RCEP as an example.  
 
  Figure 1: FTAs by Status—Total Asia (cumulative), selected years 
 
 
FTA = free trade agreement. 
Notes: 
1. Proposed: Parties consider an FTA, with the governments or relevant ministries issuing a joint statement on 
its desirability or establishment of a joint study group or joint task force for the conduct of feasibility studies. 
2. Framework Agreement signed: The parties initially negotiate the contents of a framework agreement (FA), 
which serves as a framework for future negotiations. 
3. Negotiations launched: The parties, through the relevant ministries, declare the official launch of negotiations 
or set the date for such, or start the first round of negotiations. 
4. Signed but not yet in effect: Parties sign the agreement after negotiations have been completed. However, the 
agreement has yet to be implemented. 
5. Signed and in effect: Provision of FTA has come into force after legislative or executive ratification. 
Source: Asia Regional Integration Center (ARIC) FTA database (as of July 2013). 
                                                                               
1. Japan and the Republic of Korea, for instance, had completely ignored the preferential route until recently.  Even 
though ASEAN is one of the longest-running regional cooperation arrangements among developing countries, it 
mainly operated as a politico-security pact until the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) in 1992, and even 
then it has largely remained non-preferential in its implementation of accords by pursuing voluntary 
multilateralization of preferences (Hill and Menon 2012).  
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  Figure 2: FTAs by Status—ASEAN+6 (cumulative), selected years  
 
FTA = free trade agreement. 
Notes: 
1. Proposed: Parties consider an FTA, with the governments or relevant ministries issuing a joint 
statement on its desirability or establishment of a joint study group or joint task force for the 
conduct of feasibility studies. 
2. Framework Agreement signed: The parties initially negotiate the contents of a framework 
agreement (FA), which serves as a framework for future negotiations. 
3. Negotiations launched: The parties, through the relevant ministries, declare the official launch of 
negotiations or set the date for such, or start the first round of negotiations. 
4. Signed but not yet in effect: Parties sign the agreement after negotiations have been completed. 
However, the agreement has yet to be implemented. 
5. Signed and in effect: Provision of FTA has come into force after legislative or executive ratification. 
 
Source: Asia Regional Integration Center (ARIC) FTA database (as of July 2013). 
 
 
Like any jigsaw puzzle, we begin with disarray. But the RCEP puzzle is more than just messy—
there is no solution because the pieces of the puzzle do not fit. The so-called pieces—the 
ASEAN+1 and bilateral FTAs—come in different shapes and sizes (both width and breadth) as 
well as density and vintage. Indeed, they can vary depending on the number of items that are 
up for negotiated liberalization, and usually just about everything is, including rules of origin 
(ROOs), and many of these items can vary by product or sector.  
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Table 1: Bilateral FTAs within ASEAN+6 
 
Economy Proposed 
FA Signed, Under 
Negotiation, or 
Signed but not yet  
in Effect 
Signed and in effect 
Total 
Number  
of FTAs 
Australia (AUS)  JPN; IND; INO;  
KOR; PRC 
NZ; MAL; SIN; THA 9 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
(BRU) 
   JPN 1 
People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) 
IND AUS, KOR NZ; SIN; THA 6 
India (IND) PRC AUS; INO; NZ; THA JPN; KOR; MAL; SIN 9 
Indonesia (INO)   AUS; IND; KOR JPN 4 
Japan (JPN) KOR; NZ AUS BRU; IND; INO; MAL;  
PHI; SIN; THA; VIE 
11 
Korea, Rep.  
of (KOR) 
JPN; MAL; 
THA 
AUS; INO; NZ; PRC;  
VIE 
IND; SIN 10 
Lao People’s 
Democratic  
Republic (LAO) 
   THA 1 
Malaysia (MAL) KOR  AUS; IND; JPN; NZ 5 
New Zealand 
(NZ) 
JPN IND; KOR AUS; MAL; PRC; SIN; 
THA 
8 
Philippines (PHI)    JPN 1 
Singapore (SIN)    AUS; IND; JPN; KOR; 
PRC; NZ 
6 
Thailand (THA) KOR IND AUS; JPN; LAO; PRC; 
NZ 
7 
Viet Nam (VIE)   KOR JPN 2 
Total #  
of FTAs 
5* 12* 23* 40* 
* Unique FTAs (to avoid double counting). Cambodia and Myanmar have no bilateral FTAs. 
Source: ARIC FTA database (as of July 2013), Asia Regional Integration Center (ARIC). 
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With ROOs, for instance, there are at least 22 different types in operation among the ASEAN+1 
FTAs. This total was arrived at after aggregating ROOs that are similar but not the same, and 
ignoring the fact that some tariff lines have more than one ROO that needs to be met, which 
could be added to the tally. There are eight different types of ROOs that apply to the 
electronics chapter alone (HS 85). Even automotive products (HS 87), with just 76 6-digit tariff 
lines, have six different types of ROOs operating. Only about 30% of tariff lines across these 
FTAs share common ROOs (Medalla 2011). There is not only significant variation in ROOs 
across products within an FTA, but also across FTAs for the same product. The 40 bilateral 
FTAs (Table 1) between individual members of RCEP further complicate the picture. Take, for 
instance, the Japan–India FTA, which has 12 types of ROOs, seven of which cannot be found in 
any of the other ASEAN+1 FTAs. Almost two-thirds of tariff lines use one of these seven new 
ROOs, and about one-half have to comply with two ROOs: a change in tariff sub-heading and 
a 40% domestic content requirement. The ASEAN–India FTA, on the other hand, is the only 
ASEAN+1 FTA that does not have the de minimis provision, which provides for change-in-
tariff-classification that facilitates product fragmentation trade. The sheer number of ROOs 
and lack of commonality in their application to tariff lines across FTAs, or variations in the 
provisions of ROOs across FTAs, raise obvious difficulties in harmonizing and consolidating 
them.  
 
But consolidate them they must, if RCEP is to eventuate. The question is how and in what 
form.   The only way to make the pieces fit is to reshape them: either to shave them down or to 
build them up. Shaving down the bits can be thought of as a “race to the bottom,” where the 
lowest common denominator rules, making for an easier fit. Building them up entails the 
opposite, where laggards reform to meet the standards set by the front-runner(s).  
 
Details remain sparse, but what we do know from RCEP’s Guiding Principles is that it will add 
to, rather than replace, existing ASEAN+1 FTAs, while at the same time introducing “significant 
improvements” over these agreements. There is, however, an important qualifier in the 
dreaded flexibility clause: “RCEP will include appropriate forms of flexibility including provision 
for special and differential treatment, plus additional flexibility to the least-developed ASEAN 
Member States.” Pursuing harmonization while retaining flexibility is likely to produce one of 
two outcomes. Harmonization implies consensus and a race to the bottom is likely because the 
country with the lobby that has the most to lose from the dilution of ROOs is also likely to be 
the most belligerent, and least likely to compromise. Since the gains to a country looking to 
retain protection usually outweigh the benefits to others from liberalizing ROOs, the incentive 
structure would favor the former.2 This follows from Baldwin’s (2006) asymmetric lobbying 
theory, which explains why potential losers tend to lobby harder. Alternatively, countries 
exercising flexibility could result in conservatism—approximating the status quo and 
preserving the current noodle bowl.” These outcomes are more likely than the hoped for race-
to-the-top scenario, unless incentives are provided to overcome pressure from the vested 
interests that lobbied for different ROOs to begin with. The very existence of so many ROOs 
and exemptions confirms the power of such lobbies. Breaking through these pressures will not 
                                                                               
2. It is not uncommon for the main beneficiaries of such liberalization to lie outside the bloc, especially if the bloc 
is not big enough to include the lowest-cost supplier, but then their interests are not represented and do not 
factor in the calculus. 
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be easy, and will require a stronger commitment to reform from all members, big or small, 
strong or weak (Menon 2013). The problem is that some countries may not see any carrot—
and there is no stick. Almost in desperation, some have even identified the flexibility itself as 
the carrot, highlighting RCEP's commitment not to impose or compel commitments from its 
members. If this is the carrot, then it cannot be much of one, and it comes at the expense of 
the stick. 
 
If either a race to the bottom or a minimal change scenario plays out, then RCEP will be largely 
redundant. Although cumulation rules may expand through increased membership, this 
usually amounts to little when product fragmentation of trade is significant (Menon 2012). 
Changing the type of ROO is more important, but also more difficult. The South Asia Free 
Trade Agreement (SAFTA), a failed attempt at consolidation, illustrates this. Most trade within 
South Asia continues under more generous bilateral FTAs or under most favored nation 
(MFN) rates (Weerakoon 2008). Sadly, SAFTA’s main contribution has been to add another 
strand to the global spaghetti bowl.  
 
Will the same fate befall RCEP? Unless there is enough political will to close potential 
loopholes disguised as flexibility and pursue reforms deeper than those ever before attempted, 
RCEP’s future as a consolidated bloc remains uncertain. RCEP faces many challenges but this 
is the fundamental one. Previous assessments of challenges facing RCEP have failed to 
recognize this fundamental constraint, and have focused on side issues ranging from the 
apparent need to address agriculture more fully to even proposing increasing investment in 
infrastructure (Das 2012, Kawai and Wignaraja 2013). It is difficult to imagine how a preferential 
agreement can deal with agricultural liberalization more fully when the greatest distortion in 
this sector relates to production subsidies, which cannot be removed selectively or 
preferentially. To suggest that infrastructure investment should be increased in order to make 
RCEP or any other FTA more effective is to confuse means and ends. Asia may need more 
investment in infrastructure but this should not be to make a second-best policy appear less 
so, but to promote growth and development, for its own sake. 
 
We have discussed RCEP in some detail in order to illustrate the difficulties associated with 
regional consolidation, but the other important mega-regional in the Asia and Pacific region is 
the proposed TPP agreement. Mega-regionals like the TPP can cut across geographic 
subregions, and unlike RCEP it is not aimed at consolidation since not all members have 
bilateral FTAs between them nor are they part of common plurilateral agreements. But where 
they do exist, there is no intention of preserving any of the bilateral or plurilateral agreements 
among members. It is clear in its aim to further by creating an agreement so deep that it should 
neutralize any existing agreements either by matching or superseding them. The TPP’s agenda 
is more wide-ranging and ambitious than Doha. In addition to harmonizing ROOs and the like, 
just as with solving the regional puzzle, it purports to address areas that have never been 
successfully dealt with before by any of the countries involved. But prospects for completion 
are not looking good. The TPP has already missed three deadlines, the latest one being 
October 2013. 
 
This is not surprising if one looks closely at what is being attempted, and compares it with the 
Doha experience. Although there are less countries involved in TPP negotiations compared to 
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Doha, the difficulties that diversity in positions introduces into the negotiating process is not a 
linear function of the number of countries involved; that is, moving from more than 150 
countries to 12 does not proportionately reduce diversity in negotiating positions. To illustrate 
the point, there can be as much diversity between two countries as there are among a group of 
150 if the two have very different positions on key issues. When a grouping includes countries 
as varied as Viet Nam, Brunei Darussalam, Peru, and the US, then there is sufficient diversity to 
complicate negotiations being pursued on a single undertaking basis, especially when the 
agenda is a highly ambitious one. For these and other reasons, there is also concern that the 
TPP is degenerating into a series of bilateral deals, with a US–Japan agreement at its core. 
Given sensitivities across members on different issues, a variety of exemptions in the form of 
so-called “carve-outs” is anticipated, and can only be accommodated through bilateral 
arrangements.  With renewed uncertainty over the prospects of the Obama Administration 
securing Trade Negotiating Authority or “fast track” from the US Congress, the future of the 
TPP remains uncertain since other members may be reluctant to sign up to an agreement 
when it remains unclear if the key proponent can actually deliver. 
 
In sum, solving the regional jigsaw puzzles is clearly a complicated exercise, and fraught with 
difficulties. This is true whether it involves consolidating existing agreements, like with RCEP, 
or not, like the TPP. In both cases, there is a serious risk of the final outcome being a highly 
diluted version of the ambition set at the very beginning of negotiations. A meaningful RCEP or 
TPP will require resolve similar to that which gave birth to the EU—an example of successful 
FTA consolidation, if nothing else. There does not seem to be such political will in Asia at the 
moment for RCEP. Given that securing trade promotion authority in the US appears 
increasingly unlikely, the future of the TPP also remains uncertain. Therefore, unless these 
challenges are overcome soon, RCEP and TPP may be seen as serving the geopolitical interests 
of a few players, to little economic effect. 
 
 
3. The Global Jigsaw Puzzle 
 
Despite the difficulties associated with solving the regional puzzles, it is still only part of the 
solution toward addressing the disarray in the world trade system. To illustrate, let us assume 
that RCEP succeeds in coming up with a consolidated agreement that supersedes its 
constituent components—that the regional jigsaw puzzled is solved and the resulting image is 
a better and brighter one than before. Let us also assume that the TPP is concluded as 
originally intended, as are all the other mega-blocs around the world. If this is the best-case 
scenario, what does success look like? Not good at all, unfortunately—it would merely 
substitute the mess at the regional level with one at the global level. We end up with a 
fragmented world trade system, or one that is carved up into distinct blocs. 
 
Solving the global jigsaw puzzle can be pursued in a number of ways. One often discussed 
proposal is to try and tie-up the various regional blocs so that they may be linked together, 
almost seamlessly. Is this likely? 
 
All of the problems associated with solving the regional jigsaw puzzle are also present in solving 
the global puzzle. Furthermore, there are additional complications that arise. Not only are 
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some pieces of the jigsaw puzzle missing (parts of South and Central Asia, the Middle East, and 
the Pacific island countries are absent); there are also overlapping bits or pieces that are 
redundant and probably irreconcilable. And unlike with RCEP, for instance, the global puzzle 
cannot be solved by retaining the regional ones—the intention is for them to disappear.  
Therefore, the link-ups must go at least as far as, or further than, what exists in their 
constituent parts for the outcome to approximate multilateral free trade. But then this is akin 
to concluding Doha, and there is no reason to expect that link-ups of this nature will make the 
task any easier. While there are cases of successful regional consolidation, such as the EU and 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), cross-regional link-ups of mega-blocs 
have no precedent. Needless to say, multiple tie-ups of the mega-blocs, approximating global 
multilateral free trade, have never been attempted. 
 
Although the example of RCEP highlights the diversity that can exist between FTAs within a 
regional bloc, the diversity between regional blocs is likely to be as high or higher still. 
Furthermore, it is unclear how the process of global consolidation of the regional blocs will take 
place. Should it proceed sequentially, or should there be a kind of single undertaking where the 
different blocs come together to negotiate a comprehensive deal? If the latter sounds like 
Doha, then it is because it is strikingly similar in terms of process, and likely to be just as difficult 
to conclude. A sequential bloc-by-bloc, or bottom-up, approach, building on the open 
accession clauses of existing agreements, may not be much easier either. Assuming that RCEP 
can harmonize its services sector liberalization or harmonization of sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) standards with that of the TTP or T-TIP, for instance, will it be able to also merge them 
with the South American, or African, blocs, or indeed both? The gulf in the levels of 
development between these blocs, as well as other forms of diversity, poses obvious 
difficulties. Furthermore, if the route taken toward liberalizing services, for instance, is through 
mutual recognition arrangements (MRAs), as is the case with ASEAN, rather than 
harmonization through regulatory convergence toward a regional standard, then the merging 
of different blocs is even more difficult. Unless the modality employed for liberalization is 
conducive to expansion, the much bandied about open accession clauses will mean little in 
practice, especially when considering that the countries looking to accede would not have had 
any input into the negotiated outcome, and would have to fully accept whatever has been 
agreed. 
 
Proponents of FTAs argue that deeper agreements can be achieved more rapidly on difficult 
issues when there are only a small number of negotiating partners involved, and there is 
evidence to support this argument. But many advocates fail to explain how this principle works 
within the context of FTA consolidation, or indeed in terms of inter-regional tie-ups in solving 
the global puzzle. No one has addressed the issue of how these deeper accords can suddenly 
be agreed upon by reversing the process and adding more countries, or regions.3 The 
experience with the ASEAN+1 negotiation process is that in all of their FTAs the ASEAN+6 
member countries have negotiated different terms from the newer “CLMV” members 
comprising Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, and Viet Nam 
(Menon and Melendez 2011). In some of these FTAs, such as the ASEAN–India agreement, the 
                                                                               
3. If access to a bigger market is the lure, enabling the process of adding more countries without diluting accords, 
then would not the Doha Round be a better, if not easier, process? It may be better. But we know it is not easier. 
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terms vary across almost every member, reflecting the reality that countries always negotiate 
individually rather than as a group, and a common position is only one of a number of possible 
outcomes. If this process is replicated when it comes to solving the global puzzle, with 
individual countries or even coalitions of countries within each region negotiating separately, 
the process could be an extremely cumbersome and difficult one. Again, the snags with 
concluding Doha come to mind.  
 
In truth, consolidation at the regional or global level may be just as difficult, if not more so, than 
starting from scratch, as there are no discrepancies to be resolved or policies to be reversed. 
Getting a pair of countries to agree on a specific set of terms will not necessarily facilitate 
similar breakthroughs with third parties. To ignore this is to ignore on-the-ground realities and 
the political economy of FTA negotiations. Anyone who has looked closely at an FTA will know 
how difficult the task of enmeshing even two similar agreements can be, let alone many 
different ones. The experience of the Pacific Basin Initiative, involving four Latin American 
countries—Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru—confirms the point. After several decades of 
trying to harmonize their bilateral FTAs to arrive at a consolidated regional one, they finally 
gave up and decided to start negotiations again almost from scratch, which seemed to work. 
 
 
4. The Way Forward 
 
There is a sense of deja vu about the current state of the world trade system. The last time the 
world appeared to be disintegrating into regional blocs—with the EU pressing ahead with its 
“1992 Agenda,” the apparent build-up of momentum for an embryonic Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), and NAFTA threatening to spread southward—it helped conclude a 
difficult multilateral round of negotiations. Hill (1994) described how deteriorating trade 
relations among key economies helped rather than hindered the move toward concluding the 
Uruguay Round. There was also growing tension in world trade, exemplified by the 
deteriorating US–Japan relationship at that time, although the PRC appears to have taken 
Japan’s place today. Many hope that the re-emergence of regionalism and trade friction among 
major economies will result in history repeating itself by reviving multilateralism. The repeat of 
history appears less likely now that the single undertaking appears to have been replaced by 
the cherry-picking process with the passing of the WTO’s multilateral agreement on trade 
facilitation. In any case, the Uruguay Round did not dissolve regionalism around the world and 
in fact, regionalism continued to grow in its aftermath. Doha could never have addressed the 
negative consequences of regionalism either. Whatever happens at the multilateral level, there 
will be a need for regional blocs to address the discrepancies reflecting disparate and 
independently negotiated outcomes. An obvious and practical solution would be to 
multilateralize their regionalism by offering their negotiated concessions to nonmembers in a 
non-discriminatory manner. If all regional blocs can see the benefit of pursuing this course of 
action, we will have an outcome that is not just as good as that of Doha, but much better.  
 
It could be better than Doha for at least two reasons. First, Doha is, in essence, the world's 
largest FTA in that concessions are traded reciprocally among members, and non-WTO 
members—of which there are still about 40—are excluded. Many of these nonmembers are 
small, poor, fragile or landlocked (or isolated in other ways); face high trade costs; and are 
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subject to a host of other vulnerabilities. The benefits from engaging them in greater 
commercial exchange will be substantial, mostly to them but also for the rest of the world. The 
multilateralization of preferences to all, and not just the WTO membership, would achieve 
this. It would also eliminate the need for ROOs. Second, and more important, it will do what 
Uruguay could not, and Doha cannot, and that is to remove, as opposed to dilute, preference 
discrepancies and other distortions associated with discriminatory arrangements. The 
contradictions of the jigsaw puzzle will finally be eliminated and the spaghetti bowl emptied of 
its hazardous content.  
 
In Asia, for instance, more than three-quarters of imports for all RCEP countries, except for the 
PRC and Australia, are already covered or are about to be covered by an FTA (Figure 3, 
Table 2). For ASEAN+6 as a group, more than one-third of imports are already covered by 
FTAs, with another one-third about to be covered with FTA negotiations ongoing. In this 
context, there is little point in holding out to negotiate reciprocity with a residual set of 
countries, usually small in terms of trade volumes, especially when full utilization cannot be 
assured, but trade diversion and deflection are real risks. When country X has concluded FTAs 
with most of its major trading partners, preference erosion necessarily sets in, and there is 
often little, if any, preference advantage between the trading partners in country X’s market. 
The only significant advantage that FTA partners have is over the countries that do not have 
an FTA with country X. When the non-FTA partners as a group do not supply a significant 
share of country X’s imports, there is likely to be much less resistance from FTA partners to the 
multilateralization of preferences. In other words, the proliferation of FTAs is not only eroding 
preferences between FTA partners, it will also eventually lead to a situation where the 
perceived cost (to FTA partners) of multilateralizing preferences (to non-FTA partners) starts 
to diminish, and particularly in relation to the rising cost (to country X) of maintaining multiple 
FTAs and implementing their ROOs.  
 
Figure 3: ASEAN+6 Imports from FTA partners as % of Total Imports, 2011 
 
 
Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
Source: Author’s computations based on IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (data downloaded 
May 2013) and Menon (2014). 
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Table 2: Value of Goods Imports from FTA Partners ($ million)  
and Share in Total Imports (%), 2011 
 
Economy Proposed
FA Signed, Under Negotiation, 
or Signed but not yet in Effect Ratified
Total Imports 
from FTA partners
Australia 
  
              2,073.5                        85,313.3          91,051.7           178,438.5  
0.8% 32.8% 35.0% 68.6% 
Brunei Darussalam                          1,051.8           5,267.9          6,319.7  
0.0% 16.4% 82.3% 98.7% 
Cambodia                   19.4                            285.9         10,568.0             10,873.3  
0.2% 2.3% 83.7% 86.1% 
People’s Republic  
of China 
           61,403.0                      393,988.8       428,091.6           883,483.4  
3.5% 22.6% 24.6% 50.7% 
India             11,643.6                      215,069.2       128,698.3           355,411.1  
2.5% 46.2% 27.7% 76.4% 
Indonesia             11,206.3                        28,483.0        119,985.7           159,675.0  
6.3% 16.1% 67.6% 90.0% 
Japan                 516.3                      520,084.7       155,639.9           676,240.9  
0.1% 60.8% 18.2% 79.1% 
Republic of Korea             23,301.3                      261,776.9        191,875.3           476,953.5  
4.4% 49.9% 36.6% 90.9% 
Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic 
                    0.3                            292.5            4,198.5               4,491.2  
0.0% 6.3% 90.6% 96.9% 
Malaysia               8,199.9                        40,083.8        114,938.2           163,222.0  
4.4% 21.4% 61.3% 87.0% 
Myanmar                     8.8                            206.7           12,756.1             12,971.6  
0.1% 1.5% 93.2% 94.8% 
New Zealand                 176.3                        11,247.1          17,244.7             28,668.0  
0.5% 30.6% 47.0% 78.1% 
Philippines               6,586.1                         4,447.1          33,452.5             44,485.7  
10.9% 7.4% 55.6% 74.0% 
Singapore                 141.6                        92,555.1       228,260.1           320,956.8  
0.0% 25.3% 62.4% 87.7% 
Thailand               3,061.9                        41,233.9         131,155.0           175,450.9  
1.3% 18.0% 57.2% 76.6% 
Viet Nam               1,061.7                        14,638.9         73,933.8             89,634.4  
1.0% 14.0% 70.7% 85.8% 
ASEAN+6 Total  129,400.1                   1,710,758.8   1,747,117.4        3,587,276.3  
  2.6% 34.2% 34.9% 71.6% 
Source: Author’s computations based on IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (data downloaded May 2013) and Menon (2014).
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But this is already happening. Apart from Europe, utilization rates of preferences are generally 
low, particularly in Asia. As a result, the trade-weighted preference margin for intra-ASEAN 
trade in 2008, for instance, was a mere 2.3%, while 72.9% of trade traveled at a zero MFN rate, 
according to the WTO (2011). Globally, only about 15% of trade flows are conducted under 
preferential terms, while the costs of trying to implement largely unused preferential 
arrangements continue to increase. The fact that preference utilization rates are generally less 
than complete needs to be taken into account in quantifying the impacts of FTAs, and in 
assessing the relative merits of pursuing nonreciprocal modalities of liberalization such as the 
multilateralization of preferences. Previous studies on the impacts of FTAs in East Asia, for 
instance, have assumed full utilization of preferences. The evidence suggests that this 
assumption is seriously in error, with the estimated uptake particularly low in this region. In 
assessing the impact of tariff liberalization in the case of RCEP, our regional puzzle example, 
Menon (2014c) assumes a more realistic utilization rate of 25% and then compares impacts 
under various scenarios. These scenarios include solving the regional puzzle (RCEP) with 
complete (Scenario 1, or S1) and incomplete (25%) utilization (S2); multilateralization of 
preferences by RCEP members (S3); an attempt at moving toward solving the global puzzle by 
linking RCEP with a rest-of-the-world (ROW) FTA, but again with complete (S4) and 
incomplete (S5) utilization, and finally a global free trade scenario (S6), which could be 
achieved by successfully solving the global puzzle or by all countries pursuing 
multilateralization of preferences. 
 
Table 3 compares preferential liberalization with multilateralization of preferences and we find 
that the latter is superior in all cases, and especially when incomplete utilization is taken into 
account. We find that actual utilization rates significantly diminish the benefits from 
preferential liberalization, but in a nonlinear way. In general, when members extend their 
preferential reductions to nonmembers on a non-discriminatory basis, welfare is enhanced 
because of three primary effects: (i) the extent of the liberalization is greater, (ii) the broader 
liberalization undoes the welfare-reducing trade diversion resulting from the preferential 
liberalization, and (iii) the productivity of scarce resources within each member country is 
allocated more efficiently across its industries. 
 
S4 and S5 are akin to cross-regional tie-ups of FTAs, whereby the ROW grouping reciprocates 
by reducing its tariffs on exports from ASEAN+6. As noted, this would be a stylized example of 
how we could go about solving the global jigsaw puzzle. The benefits to members when 
reciprocity is introduced are greater than S3 only when there is full utilization of preferences 
(S4). If utilization is incomplete (S5), then members benefit more from multilateralization of 
preferences (S3). However, the gross national product (GNP) of ROW falls by 0.15% under S4 
(with much smaller declines under S5). These are the largest reductions for nonmembers 
under any of the scenarios. The additional gains to members, with full utilization of preferences 
(S4), appear to occur at the expense of nonmembers. This raises the potential for possible 
retaliatory actions by nonmembers, reducing the benefits to the world as a whole. If the 
maximum gains to members accrue at the expense of potential retaliatory actions, then the 
possibility of trade deflection raises the likelihood of low utilization rates. Since tariffs between 
large trading blocs such as NAFTA and the EU, and other significant groupings such as 
South America and Africa, remain unchanged, there are significant opportunities, and benefits, 
from trying to deflect trade in order to obtain duty-free access. 
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In the final scenario of global liberalization, which is most likely to be achieved by all countries 
pursuing multilateralization of preferences, the GNP of all member countries would be 
increased. For RCEP members, there is little difference to the welfare effects of global 
liberalization (S6) versus multilateralization of preferences (S3). This finding has important 
implications for policy. It suggests that it is very much within the control of member countries 
to initiate actions that will produce the almost best welfare outcomes from trade liberalization. 
There is really no need to wait for an unlikely global liberalization solution for members to reap 
the benefits from it. It also appears that there is little to be gained from reciprocity, given time 
delays, negotiating costs, and uncertainty in the magnitude of benefits if utilization is 
incomplete. 
 
Surely multilateralization deserves more serious consideration than ever before, and should no 
longer be dismissed as “pie in the sky.” After all, this kind of unilateral action had accounted for 
more than two-thirds of all trade liberalization by developing countries in the 2 decades leading 
up to 2003 (World Bank 2005). There is also a host of other evidence,4 including that of 
Vezina (2010), which shows that it was unilateral actions which played an overwhelming role in 
trade liberalization of the original ASEAN members, and in drawing in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to these countries to supplant the regional supply chain. In this way, the rise 
in regionalism may eventually be the most compelling factor in contributing to its own demise 
by revitalizing multilateralization, if not the multilateral system. As Hill and Menon (2008) put 
it, the proliferation of bilateral and plurilateral FTAs may eventually lead to them collapsing 
under their own weight. 
 
While the application of the multilateralization approach is relatively straightforward when it 
comes to tariffs and other similar technical barriers, it is also an approach naturally suited to 
nontariff barriers (NTBs) and difficult sectors such as services. Although bilateral or regional 
negotiations can play a role in having an NTB removed, once they are removed, it may be 
difficult or costly to exclude third parties from participating or sharing in the benefits. The 
removal of many NTBs share public good characteristics in that they are non-excludable and 
nonrival in consumption; that is, once they are provided (this provision may involve removing a 
constraint), then it is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid free-riding. Unlike tariffs, it is either 
costly, often prohibitively so, or impractical to remove NTBs in an exclusive or preferential 
manner. Similarly, if services liberalization is pursued through harmonization of standards 
rather than MRAs, nonmembers can easily accede. In either case, the possibility of 
multilateralizing harmonized rules and regulations or mutually recognized requirements is 
present, although it is more easily done with the former than with the latter 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
                                                                               
4. For more examples, ranging from Australia and New Zealand to India and Central Europe, refer to the two 
volume publication edited by Jagdish Bhagwati (2002), and summarized in the Introduction. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The rise of mega-regionals—such as RCEP, the TPP, and theT-TIP—suggests that the world 
trade system is more like a jigsaw puzzle than a spaghetti bowl these days. There are both 
regional and global jigsaw puzzles to be solved—and in that order—if order is to return to a 
fragmented world trade system. But both the regional and global puzzles may remain just that, 
given the difficulties associated with resolving the problems at each level. The difficulties of 
FTA consolidation at the regional level have been widely documented, while piecing together 
the blocs around the world to form a coherent whole is even more challenging, and has never 
been attempted. In this context, a way forward is to return to the most widely used modality of 
trade liberalization—unilateral actions—but this time involving the multilateralization of 
preferences rather than unreciprocated reductions in tariff rates. As more and more FTAs are 
negotiated, preference erosion sets in, reducing the resistance of FTA partners to 
multilateralization. Its application to tariffs and other technical barriers is straightforward, but it 
is also an approach naturally suited to NTBs and difficult sectors such as services. The removal 
of many NTBs share public good characteristics that make it either costly or impractical to be 
discriminatory or exclusive. Similarly, if services liberalization is pursued through harmonization 
of standards or MRAs, the possibility of multilateralization exists. If harmonization is achieved 
through regulatory convergence, for instance, rather than through MRAs, it will facilitate 
multilateralization because it will be easier for nonmembers to accede. Therefore, 
multilateralization of preferences, whether tariff or nontariff, appears to present a practical way 
forward in addressing the disarray in the world trade system. 
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